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The New Cap on
Non-Economic Damages
and Health Claims
Arbitration in
Maryland-An Overview
by Jonathan Schochor, Esq.

he 1986 Maryland legislature passed
a new law which arbitrarily caps or
limits the right of catastrophically
injured plaintiffs to be fully, fairly and
adequately compensated. The law, which
became effective on July 1, 1986, places a
cap of $350,000.00 for all non-economic
losses regardless of the extent of injuries
and the circumstances of the specific case. I
Accordingly, Maryland citizens who are
injured at the hands of negligence on or
after July 1, 1986, cannot under any circumstances, receive a judgment in excess
of $350,000.00 for "non-economic damages" which include pain and suffering,
physical impairment, disability, inconvenience, disfigurement, and other nonpecuniary damages. 2
In addition to creating the cap, the new
law requires the trier offact (whether it is a
jury or a Health Claims Arbitration panel)
to itemize damages for past medical expenses, future medical expenses, past lost
earnings, future lost earnings, non-economic and other damages. Further, if the
plaintiff dies prior to the payment of all
future medical expenses awarded, the remaining portion of the award reverts to the
insurance carrier or the defendant instead
of going to the estate of the decedent. Finally, the court or the arbitration panel may
also order any and all future economic
damages to be paid by periodic payments
(commonly referred to as an "annuity") instead of a lump sum.
As is apparent, the rights of seriously injured plaintiffs have been compromised as
a result of the liability "insurance crisis"
which began over a year ago with artifi-
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cially skyrocketing premiums and arbitrary cancellation of various liability policies. 3 Municipalities, camps, skating rinks,
bus companies, physicians, attorneys and
many others experienced exorbitant premium increases or found that insurance
was essentially "unavailable". Through
public relations and advertising, the insurance industry attempted to fault lawyers, jurors or injured victims for this
"crisis."
However, a more objective analysis indicates that the "crisis" resulted from poor
management practices by the insurance industry. Insurance carriers have essentially
two streams of income from which to pay
claims and record a profit: 1) the premium
dollars that policyholders pay to purchase
insurance coverage; and 2) investment income which is earned on funds that are received and not utilized to pay claims. Accordingly, when interest rates are high
(such as they were in the early 1980's) the
insurance industry attempts to attract as
many policyholders as possible to increase
the number of premium dollars received.
In order to attract additional funds, the industry cuts premiums to sell as many policies as possible. After receipt of these funds,
the carriers invest the money to obtain the
highest return on investment, resulting in
large profits.
On the other hand, when interest rates
fall to reasonable levels (as they did in the
mid 1980's), the amount of the investment
income earned by the insurance carriers
drops dramatically. The industry then attempts to maintain billion dollar profits by
increasing premiums.

Clearly this increase in policy premiums
has nothing to do with the amount ofjudgments awarded or the number of cases
filed. Rather, the insurance companies
increase premiums in an effort to maintain
profit margins and recoup lost income due
to falling interest rates and poor business
practices. 5
Furthermore, the insurance industry
falsely appears to lose money while reaping large profits. This is accomplished by
inflating estimated future claims and payouts, while setting aside large "loss reserves" to cover these hypothetical future
losses. Incredibly, the insurance companies
invest these reserves and earn continuing
investment income while claiming them as
tax losses. That is how the property/casualty insurance industry made a 75 billion
dollar profit between 1975 and 1984, but
showed a paper loss, and avoided the payment of income taxes. 6
Because of such accounting practices,
property/casualty insurance industry's
stock prices have increased over seventy
percent (70%) between January 1, 1984
and June 30, 1986, and the net worth of
liability insurance companies have more
than quadrupled, from 20 billion dollars to
over 91 billion dollars.8 Further, in 1986,
the industry'S net worth increased by over
21 billion dollars. 9 Indeed, between 1975
and 1985, the property/casualty insurance
companies in Maryland charged more
than 18.2 billion dollars in premiums (excluding any investment income) but paid
out only 10.02 billion dollars in losses. 10
Unsatisfied with increased assets of7.6
billion dollars in 1985 II and a profit 0"
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11.5 billion dollars in 1986,12 the industry
elected to engage in a coordinated campaign
to press for "tort reform" notwithstanding
estimated profits of90 billion dollars in the
next four years. 13 The industry's version
of reform is to limit the rights of catastrophically injured victims in suing and recovering damages to which they are entitled. By
withdrawing from some markets and raising premiums drastically in others, the insurers continue to attempt to curtail the
rights of those injured through negligence.
The chief executive officer of Geico Insurance Company best explained the insurers' strategy in 1985: "It is right for the
industry to withdraw from the insurance
market and let the pressures for reform
build in the state legislatures." 14 .
Thus, a 6.5 million dollar national advertising campaign was launched ·to create
the perception of a "lawsuit crisis" with an
emphasis on medical negligence cases. 15
Industry leaders, supported by medical interests, attempted to argue that judgments
and settlements were extraordinaril¥ high.
In fact, the opposite is true. There is no
runaway judgment or award problem in
Maryland. Between 1980 and 1984, Medical Mutual (the insurance carrier which
insures the majority of Maryland doctors)
received approximately 152 million dollars in premiums and investment income.
However, the company only paid out approximately 37 million dollars during tg.!lt
same time period. 16 Moreover, malpractice premiums in Maryland make up less
than 1% of the total cost of delivering
health care to the public. 17 What becomes
painfully clear is that Maryland citizens
have not abused their right to be adequately
compensated when injured through the negligence of a physician or another defendant.
Nevertheless, the new cap discriminates
against plaintiffs who have suffered devastating injuries at the hands of negligent
defendants by arbitrarily limiting their recoveries regardless of the circumstances of
the case. Such legislation supplants the
role of the jury or panel in determining the
extent and nature of damages to be awarded
in a particular case. 18
Tragically, it is essentially admitted that
the cap will not significantly reduce premiums charged by the insurance industry.
Indeed, within thirty days of the time,
former Governor Hughes signed the cap
into law, Medical Mutual requested and
was granted a 500/0 rate increase in premiums. 19 It is obvious that the insurance
interests cannot square this conduct with
the legislation passed. Further, in Florida
where similar restrictions were passed,
two major insurance carriers, Aetna and
St. Paul Fire and Marine, filed data with
the Insurance Commissioner indicating
16-The Law Forum/Spring, 1987

that the "tort reform" legislation would
have essentially no impact on premiums
charged for insurance. St. Paul concluded
that" ... our best estimate is no effect from
the tort changes." 20
The proper remedy for the industry's
self-created "crisis" is legislation to require
the disclosure of the accounting practices,
reserves, true profits and other data with
which to properly regulate the industry.
Clearly, the insurance carriers should be
held accountable to make premiums charged
various policyholders commensurate with
legitimate claims and true liability incurred
-not paper liabilities designed to retain
funds and maximize billion dollar profits
in the industry.

"the newly created
cap will penalize
persons whose lives
have already been
shattered through
the negligence
of others"

Highlights of Changes Made in
Health Claims Arbitration
Health Claims Arbitration involves the
vast majority of medical negligence cases
in which the negligence occurred on or
after July 1, 1976. 21 Each case is heard before a panel comprised of three persons: a
lawyer acting as a chairperson, a health care
provider and a layman. A verdict is obtained
by an affirmative vote of two of the three
panel members, who not only determine
liability but also assess damages. If any
party is aggrieved by the results of the arbitration, an appeal may be taken to the appropriate circuit court with proper venue. 22

On appeal, the proceedings are "de novo"
but with a "presumption of correctness." 23
In essence, the presumption amounts to an
instruction to the jury indicating that the
decision of the arbitration panel is "presumed correct." This is a rebuttable presumption which the jury may accept or reject based upon the evidence presented. 24
In addition to creating the cap, the legislature altered Health Claims Arbitration in
six major areas. First, on or after July 1,
1986, a claimant or plaintiff is required to
file a certificate of a qualified expert, indicating that there is a violation of the standards of care and that the departure from
the standards of care caused the alleged injury. This report or "certificate of merit"
must be filed within ninety days of the
date the claimant files a claim with the
Health Claims Arbitration Office. Failure
to do so will result in the claim being dismissed, without prejudice. 25 Obviously,
this provision is intended to weed out
frivolous cases.
Second, a health care provider defendant is required to file a certificate of a qualified expert attesting to compliance with
the standards of care or that any violation
of the standards of care did not proximately
cause the alleged injury. This certificate
must be filed within 120 days after the
claimant files the initial certificate. Failure
to file the certificate will result in an adjudication in favor of the claimant on the
issue ofliability.26 As with the certificate
of merit, the defendant's certificate is intended to identify cases which should not
be defended.
Third, the legislature placed a limitation on the attesting expert witness who
prepares a certificate of merit or meritorious defense, requiring that he or she may
not "... devote annually more than 200/0 of
the expert's professional activities to activities that directly involve testimony in personal injury claims." 27 This requirement
will have a "chilling effect" on any expert's
willingness to prepare a certificate because
of probable attempts to scrutinize the financial affairs of such an expert. Interestingly experts testifying at trial are not limited to this 200/0 rule. 28
Fourth, the new law limits testimony in
any arbitration proceeding to two experts
in a "designated specialty" unless the panel
chairman determines that good cause is
shown for additional expert testimony.29
Essentially, this provision further limits
the ability of the claimant, who has the
burden of proof throughout the course of
the proceedings, to make a full, fair and
adequate presentation of the evidence involved. There is no reason for an arbitrary
limitation of two experts in any field. In
cases of significant injuries, complex med-

ical issues or those involving the overlap
of medical fields or sub-specialties, the
parties should be permitted to present as
much expert testimony as necessary to
prove or defend their cases.
Fifth, the new law permits authenticated
hospital records and records of treating
health care providers to be admitted at the
arbitration proceedings without any custodian or other witness sponsoring them,
subject to the opposing party's right to
take a deposition. 3D This is ostensibly designed to "expedite" the arbitration proceedings by eliminating the necessity for
testimony by a custodian of records.
Sixth, the new law incorporates all Maryland Rules of Procedure into Health Claims
Arbitration. 31 Additionally, if an arbitration panel finds "that the conduct of any
party in maintaining or defending any action is in bad faith or without substantial
justification" the panel may order the offending party, his counsel, or both to pay
costs plus reasonable expenses including
attorney's fees. 32

Conclusion
As is patently clear, the newly created cap
will penalize persons whose lives have already been shattered through the negligence
of others without significantly reducing insurance premiums. The legislation simply
represents the erosion of plaintiffs' rights
across the State of Maryland for adequate,
fair and complete compensation for injuries sustained as a result of proven negligence on the part of health care providers
and other defendants. The legislation, as it
exists, should be repealed or declared unconstitutional, with legislation passed to
permit full scrutiny and regulation of the
insurance industry.
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